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Foucault, Weber, Neoliberalism and the Politics of 
Governmentality 
 
Terry Flew 
 
The publication of The Birth of Biopolitics in 2008, which was the translation into 
English of Michael Foucault’s 1978-79 lectures at the College de France, has 
generated an important body of scholarship that has sought to engage the themes of 
Foucault’s lectures in light of contemporary concerns. The timeliness of this 
publication was seen by many to arise from its contemporary relevance. As the global 
economy rocked under the weight of a financial crisis in 2007-08 that exposed the 
extent to which growth in capitalist economies in the 1990s and 2000s had been debt-
driven and built upon unsustainable foundations, Foucault’s highly original 
reflections of the historical and conceptual origins of neoliberalism as a variant of 
liberal arts of government appeared highly prescient. He appeared to many critical 
theorists to have anticipated what would be the dominant political ideology of 
neoliberalism, which rose to prominence in the Western capitalist states with the rise 
of the Thatcher government in the UK and the Reagan administration in the US, and 
in the developing world through the ‘Washington Consensus’ approach to 
development assistance and structural adjustment. If indeed 2008 marked the crisis-
point for a 30-year political economic project of neoliberalism, then Foucault was an 
essential resource to understand how we had got to that historical point.  
 
 2 
But the ready equation of Foucault’s lectures, delivered in the context of late-1970s 
France, to the first two decades of the 21
st
 century, has itself been the source of 
several problems. One is the anachronistic reading of Foucault, where he is seen as an 
early prophet of contemporary forms of political economy, whose programmatic 
statements would be subsequently implemented by a diverse array of political leaders, 
including every U.S. President and British Prime Minister since the late-1970s. 
Another is that neoliberalism has become an explanatory term to define almost 
everything, albeit from a certain critical angle. One example of such a formulation is 
Wendy Brown’s definition of neoliberalism as ‘a governing rationality through which 
everything is “economized” and … human beings become market actors and nothing 
but, every field of activity is seen as a market, and every entity (whether public or 
private, whether person, business, or state) is governed as a firm’. 1  
 
In this sense, neoliberalism becomes what Boas and Gans-Morse described as a term 
with ‘negative normative valence’: it can be used widely, but only if it is also used 
critically. They argue that the critical usage has rendered it a ‘conceptual trash heap 
capable of accommodating multiple distasteful phenomena’. 2  There has been a 
significant degree of rhetorical inflation around the term, and what Andrew Gamble 
perceptively identified as ‘a tendency to reify neoliberalism and to treat it as a 
phenomenon which manifests itself everywhere and in everything.’3 Moreover, as 
Boas and Gans-Morse have observed, those who may be ‘neoliberals’ according to 
the critical perspective rarely use the term themselves: they may instead by classical 
liberals, libertarians, liberal democrats, modernisers or market reformers – terms with 
a more positive, or at least a more contested, normative valence.  
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Foucault’s own complex, nuanced reading of what he would term neoliberalism has 
long been at risk of being subsumed into a more generic neo-Marxist critique of 
capitalism. In such accounts, neoliberalism becomes the pejorative term used to 
describe the latest iteration of the dominant ideology through which the ruling class 
keeps the masses in subordinate power relations. In contrast to Foucault’s own 
conception of power as strategy and something that is ‘exercised only over free 
subjects, and only insofar as they are free’, and that ‘a society without power relations 
can only be an abstraction’, power is reduced to relations of domination, or the 
ideological manipulation of subjects by powerful interests.
4
  
 
It is the element of power that is not simply about domination that particular informs 
Foucault’s interest in the liberal arts of government, and how they marked a 
transformation from earlier forms of Raison d’Etat. Moreover, the account of 
neoliberalism that synthesises Foucault with Marx resist upon instrumentalist theories 
of the capitalist state, where it can be captured by certain powerful class interests and 
its policy agencies directed towards particular ends (e.g. weakening the working 
class). By contrast, Foucault is clear in The Birth of Biopolitics that he ‘must do 
without a theory of the state, just as one can and must forego an indigestible meal’. 
Rather, his interest in governmental rationalities means that ‘the state is not a 
universal nor in itself an autonomous source of power … the state is nothing else but 
the mobile effect of a regime of multiple governmentalities’. 5 
 
As a way of illustrating some of the differences, it is instructive to compare 
Foucault’s lectures on neoliberalism, which were presented in Paris in 1977-78, to 
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Stuart Hall’s essays on ‘Thatcherism’ as a new hegemonic bloc in Britain form the 
late 1970s onwards (Hall 1988).  
 
First, Hall presents Thatcherism as the outcome of changing ideologies among 
sections of the British working class, particularly around law and order, consumer 
society and nationalism. By contrast, Foucault’s account of the rise of neoliberalism 
does not hinge upon changes in electoral behaviour or popular consciousness at all; 
rather, it is consistent with a longstanding series of liberal challenges to state authority, 
that present the market as a countervailing source of knowledge and moral authority. 
From the 1940s onwards, it is challenging not only more ‘statist’ forms of 
government, but also the liberal settlement associated with Keynesian economics and 
the welfare state.  
 
Second, Hall retains a theory of the state that associates the rise of particular 
government policies with the interests of certain social classes, whereas Foucault is 
interested in the changing techniques of government itself, rather than which interests 
government policies and agencies are alleged to serve. His approach thus avoids the 
risks associated with what Paul Hirst (1990) termed the ‘pitfalls of electoral 
sociology’, where major structural changes are associated with the vagaries of 
different political coalitions.  
 
Third, Hall presented the problem for the British left arising from Thatcherism as one 
of cultural modernisation – how its ideas and institutions could win back those 
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sections of the population that had shifted allegiance towards the Conservative Party. 
By contrast, Foucault asks what can the left learn about the practices of governing 
from analysis of the rise of neoliberal governmentality.  
 
Consideration of Foucault’s approach to neoliberalism, then, requires that we 
understand his project as one of focusing upon particular forms of governmental 
power, techniques and rationalities, rather than on the projects of actual 
governments.
6
 It also points to a need for caution in simply assimilating Foucault’s 
work into neo-Marxist critiques of neoliberalism from a political economy 
perspective. 
7
 Foucault’s interest in political economy, as it emerged in Europe form 
the mid-18
th
 century onwards, was that it shifted understanding of the arts of 
government, to techniques of practical action rather than broad principles of 
legitimacy: ‘success or failure, rather than legitimacy or illegitimacy, now become the 
criteria of governmental action.’ 8  
 
This is not to say that such empirical calculations are not informed by theory or 
philosophy, but it is to note that the ‘question of liberalism’ becomes one of ‘the 
frugality of government’, whereby the market becomes ‘the standard of truth’ for 
evaluating the success or failure of governmental action. Such governmental action is 
perpetually dealing with ‘the management of freedom’ and the balance between 
freedom and security: there is a perpetual balancing act being performed between ‘too 
little’ government, which may endanger security, and ‘too much’ government, which 
may endanger individual freedom. 
9
 Somewhat paradoxically, Foucault argues that 
‘there is no liberalism without a culture of danger’,10 while at the same time pointing 
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to the emergence of a growing array of disciplinary and supervisory techniques 
emerging to manage the market economy, as well as compensatory mechanisms 
associated with it.  
 
Foucault identified the emergence of what he termed neoliberalism in the context of 
the crisis of liberalism in the 1930s. The 1930s were generally a difficult decade for 
liberalism worldwide. Liberal ideas were challenged by the Bolshevik Revolution in 
Russia and the rise of a global communist movement on the one hand, and the rise of 
Nazism in Germany and Fascism in Italy, Spain and elsewhere. Both the First and the 
Second World Wars would establish that the liberal assumption that trading nations 
would not go to war with one another did not hold. The Great Depression had also 
thrown into doubt the viability of market capitalist economies, and there had also 
been a historical shift within liberalism towards social liberalism and economic 
intervention. The New Deal in the U.S. was critical to this, as was the economics of 
John Maynard Keynes; the Popular Front government of Leon Blum in the 1930s 
pioneered the sort of interventionist program that would also be pursued in Great 
Britain and in many other countries after World War II.  
 
Foucault’s account of the emergence of neoliberalism focuses on two events in 
particular. The first is the Walter Lippmann Colloquium held in Paris in July 1939, 
which he sees as playing a key role in reformulating liberal ideas. In particular, this 
international gathering of liberal thinkers sought to overcome the dichotomy that 
existed in liberal thought between the market economy, or laissez-faire, and state 
intervention that aimed to modify the adverse effects of the market economy, such as 
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anti-monopoly laws or compensatory social policy. It was instead proposed that the 
market economy is not a ‘natural order’, but rather ‘the result of a legal order the 
presupposes juridical intervention by the state.’11 More generally, the relationship 
between the market and competition on the one hand, and the state and governmental 
rationality on the other was not ‘a reciprocal delimitation of different domains’; rather, 
‘the essence of the market can only appear if it is produced, and it is produced by an 
active governmentality’. 12  In considering the form that such an active 
governmentality should take, what is proposed is a ‘positive liberalism’ that is 
‘market-conforming’ – it is about ‘taking the formal principles of a market economy 
and referring and relating them to, of projecting them onto a general art of 
government’. 13 
 
The other major development is the role played by the Ordoliberals, also known as 
the Freiberg School of political economists, in the reconstruction of Germany after 
WWII. In contrast to the focus on Keynesian economics and planning in most 
European nations, the new (West) German state explicitly based its economic 
program on market conforming policies, such as the removal of price controls, 
balanced budgets and modest growth in credit and the supply of money. In doing so, 
they premised the legitimacy of the new state on its economic performativity, where 
‘the economy, economic development and economic growth produces sovereignty; it 
produces political sovereignty through the institutions and institutional game that, 
precisely, makes this economy work’. 14 While the influence of the Germany model of 
the social market economy has arguably not been that great in the rest of Europe – 
Foucault details reasons why it was not adopted in France, which has had a most 
historically statist mode of economic development – it became hegemonic within 
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Germany. The German Social Democratic Party (SPD), at its 1959 Bad Godesburg 
Congress, turned away from its Marxian past towards acceptance of the market 
economy and private property, as long as they were compatible with ‘an equitable 
social order’ and competitive market relations were maintained.  
 
As both William Davies
15
 and Nicholas Gane
16
 have observed, Foucault does need to 
be treated with some caution as a guide to the history and philosophy of liberalism. 
His work did not generally deal with political economy in detail, and the account in 
The Birth of Biopolitics weaves a somewhat idiosyncratic path from Jeremy Bentham 
and Adam Smith to von Mises and von Hayek, and then to the ‘Chicago School’ of 
neoclassical economists and theorists of ‘human capital’. What is missing here is the 
19
th
 century in general, and the evolution of economic thought in that period in 
particular. This matters because Foucault’s interest in anti-Keynesian ideas as 
promulgated by Hayek and Henry Simons, and later by George Stigler and Milton 
Friedman, requires some understanding of how the thinking of an author such as 
Keynes was shaped one the one hand by the British tradition of economics as framed 
by Mill, Marshall and the ‘Cambridge School’, and at the same time by the perceived 
inability of the orthodox models to deal with the economic circumstances of the 1930s 
Great Depression. 
17
 This also matters historically because the turn away from 
Keynesian economics in the 1970s and 1980s occurred as much because it was seen 
as unable to deal with the simultaneous onset of inflation and unemployment in 
capitalist economies as with a wider policy embrace of the ideas of Hayek, Friedman 
etc.
18
 Adoption of the latter set of policy prescriptions was, for the most part, confined 
to the English-speaking world, and particularly to the United States and Great 
Britain.
19
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The other problem is that while German Ordoliberalism and the Anglo-American 
brand of neo-liberalism may have common historical antecedents (such as the Walter 
Lippmann Colloquium, and the Mont Pelerin Society)
20
, they can clearly pull in two 
quite different directions. One element of the success of the German social market 
economy was that it secured the participation of the trade unions as an economic 
partner, with another being that it came to be understood as a ‘middle way’ between 
laissez-faire capitalism and state socialism, combining strong economic performance 
with appropriate social provision. In this way, it had implications that were far more 
corporatist than American neo-liberalism ever could accept, premised as it has been 
upon ‘the generalization of the economic form of the market … through the social 
body’, and upon ‘a permanent criticism of government policy’. 21 Foucault notes that 
neoliberal purists such as Hayek found themselves increasingly at odds with the 
German Ordoliberals, but the wider implications of this have rarely been pursued in 
the subsequent literature. One could similarly note that while human capital theory 
has its origins with the Chicago School of economics, the proposition that there is a 
positive correlation between levels of education and economic growth, and that the 
state has an active role in managing economic restructuring through provision of 
opportunities for worker retraining, has long been a staple of the Scandinavian social 
democratic nations, and of social democratic theories more generally.  
 
The Birth of Biopolitics also marks an engagement by Foucault with the work of Max 
Weber that is worth considering. The implicit contrasts that Foucault makes between 
German, French and American national capitalisms point towards the comparative 
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histories of capitalist economies that Weber saw as being a central task of economic 
sociology. 
22
 Other Weberian themes developed in The Birth of Biopolitics include: 
 
 The argument that German sociology had moved from the Marxist problematic 
of the contradictions of capital towards the Weberian concept of the 
contradiction between economic rationality and social irrationality, which he saw 
as central to the Frankfurt School as well as the Freiberg School of political 
economists; 
23
 
 The legal framework of capitalism, and the ethical, moral and legal frameworks 
that regulate economic activity, cannot be considered to be part of the 
superstructure, counterposed to a ‘pure’ economic realm. Rather, ‘these 
economic processes only really exist, in history, insofar as an institutional 
framework and positive rules have provided them with their conditions of 
possibility’; 24  
 Rejection of the Marxist notion that capitalism has a single universal form, and 
that there is ‘only one logic of capital’. Instead, Foucault invokes Weber to argue 
that ‘the history of capitalism can only be an economic-institutional history’ 
where ‘economic processes and institutional frameworks call on each other, 
support each other, modify and shape each other in ceaseless reciprocity’; 25 
 Capitalism thus takes a diverse array of historical forms, and there is 
considerable scope to reshape national capitalisms through interventions in 
reshaping legal, institutional, political and other arrangements that underpin 
economic processes.  
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Identifying these Weberian themes in The Birth of Biopolitics provides, in my view, 
an important insight into the politics that underpinned these lectures. The debate about 
whether Foucault’s far from polemical account of neoliberalism was an implicit 
endorsement of these ideas has raged.
26
  One hesitates to join in a debate about 
whether Foucault was ‘for’ or ‘against’ neoliberalism since, as Paul Patton points out, 
the task of historical reflection for Foucault was not one that lent itself to such simple 
binary oppositions. His interest in ideas surrounding the market and its relationship to 
liberal rationalities of government perhaps stemmed in part from his own 
dissatisfaction with the politics of the French Left. The major political development of 
this period was the dissolution of the ‘Union of the Left’, a common program of the 
French Socialist Party (PS) and the French Communist Party (PCF) agreed to in 1972, 
based around a substantial increase in forms of social provision and the 
nationalisation of key firms and industries. A long time sceptic towards the PCF, 
Foucault was probably less concerned than others on the left about the break-up of 
such an alliance, as he had never seen changes in power relations as being particularly 
contingent upon an expansion of the role of the state, or the capturing of its key 
institutions. To that extent, he shared with the neoliberals a concern that such an 
expansion of the state could constitute ‘too much’ government, and an associated risk 
to personal freedoms. He was also clearly distancing himself in this period from what 
he termed ‘state phobia’, and the associated claim that Western capitalist nations were 
moving in the direction of fascism.
27
 It is a long stretch, however, to associate this 
with an embrace of the sort of policies that would, shortly after these lectures, be 
associated with governments such as that of Margaret Thatcher in the U.K. or Ronald 
Reagan in the U.S.  
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There ahs long been a debate as to whether Foucault has become less utopian in his 
politics, and more of a political realist, in his alter lectures on governmentality. 
28
 
There is evidence to support such a claim in The Birth of Biopolitics. Reflecting on 
why the economic program of the German Christian Democratic Party interested him, 
and on the general acceptance of its core tenets by the Social Democrats, Foucault 
makes the observation that: 
 
What socialism lacks is not so much a theory of the state as a governmental 
reason, the definition of what a governmental rationality would be in 
socialism, that is to say, a reasonable and calculable measure of the extent,  
modes, and objectives of governmental action. 
29
 
 
An important difference between the socialists and the liberals, for Foucault, is the 
relative political pragmatism of the latter. Whereas socialists devote much energy to 
the question of who is a ‘true’ socialist, based on ‘conformity to a text, or to a series 
of texts’, liberals are much more interested in adapting their philosophical ideals to 
practical governmental programs, as evidenced by the ways in which the Freiberg 
school could move from relatively abstract debates around Ordoliberalism to 
successfully administering the post-war West German state. Foucault argues that 
‘there is no autonomous socialist governmentality’, and it is politically pointless to 
cour the core texts of Marxism in search of one. Instead, he argues that ‘socialism can 
only be implemented connected up to diverse forms of governmentality’, and that: 
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We can know only that if there is a really socialist governmentality, then it is 
not hidden within socialism and its texts. It cannot be deduced from them. It 
must be invented. 
30
 
  
The question then of how to govern in a different way, to match one’s utopian 
principles to the practical tasks of public administration and governmental rationality, 
is the challenge that Foucault see the neoliberals as presenting to the political left. At 
the time in which he presented these lectures, he did not believe that the left with 
which he was most familiar had met such a historical challenge.  
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